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Abstract—Supporting convolutional neural network (CNN) in-
ference on resource-constrained IoT (Internet of Things) devices
in a timely manner has been an outstanding challenge for
emerging smart systems. To mitigate the burden on IoT devices,
one prevalent solution is to offload the CNN inference task,
which is usually composed of billions of operations, to public
cloud. However, the “offloading-to-cloud” solution may cause
privacy breach while moving sensitive data to cloud. For privacy
protection, the research community has resorted to advanced
cryptographic primitives (e.g., homomorphic encryption) and ap-
proximation techniques to support CNN inference on encrypted
data. Consequently, these attempts cause impractical computa-
tional overhead on IoT devices and degrade the performance
of CNNs. Another concern of “offloading-to-cloud” besides the
privacy issue is the integrity of data. In order to avoid the heavy
computation resulted by the offloaded tasks, public cloud can
dismiss the inference request by sending back random results
to IoT devices. Moreover, relying on the remote cloud can cause
additional network latency and even make the system dysfunction
when network connection is off.
To address the challenge, we proposes an extremely lightweight
edge device assisted private CNN inference solution for IoT
devices, namely LEP-CNN. The main design of LEP-CNN is
based on a novel online/offline encryption scheme. The decryption
of LEP-CNN is pre-computed offline via utilizing the linear
property of the most time-consuming operations of CNNs. As
a result, LEP-CNN allows IoT devices to securely offload over
99% CNN operations, and edge devices to execute CNN inference
on encrypted data as efficient as on plaintext. To prevent edge
devices from returning an incorrect result, LEP-CNN provides
an integrity check option to enable the IoT devices to detect
incorrect results with a successful rate over 99%. Experiments
on AlexNet show that our scheme can speed up the CNN inference
for more than 35× for IoT devices with comparable computing
power of Raspberry Pi. We also implemented a homomorphic
encryption based privacy preserving AlexNet using the well-
known CryptoNets scheme and compared it with LEP-CNN.
We demonstrated that LEP-CNN has a better performance
than homomorphic encryption based privacy preserving neural
networks under time-sensitive scenarios.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Deep Neural Networks,
Convolutional Neural Network, Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent advances in artificial intelligence, the in-
tegration of deep neural networks and IoT is receiving in-
creasing attention from both academia and industry [1]–[3].
As the representative of deep neural networks, convolutional
neural network (CNN) has been identified as an emerging
technique to enable a spectrum of intelligent IoT applications
[4], including visual detection, smart security, audio analytics,
health monitoring, infrastructure inspection, etc. However, due
to the high computational cost introduced by CNNs, their
deployment on resource-constrained IoT devices for time-
sensitive services becomes very challenging. For example,
popular CNN architectures (e.g., AlexNet [5], FaceNet [6], and
ResNet [7]) for visual detection require billions of operations
for the execution of a single inference task. Our evaluation
results show that an inference task using AlexNet can cost
more than two minutes on an IoT device with comparable
computing capability as a Raspberry Pi (Model A). To mitigate
such a burden for IoT devices, offloading CNN tasks to public
cloud has become a popular choice in the literature. However,
this type of “cloud-backed” system may raise privacy concerns
[8] by sending sensitive data to remote cloud. Also, the
integrity of the returned results cannot be guaranteed when
the cloud is “curious-and-dishonest”. Moreover, connecting
to cloud can cause additional latency to the system under
network congestion and even make the system dysfunction
when network is off [9].
In time-sensitive CNN-driven IoT applications, the infer-
ence stage of a trained CNN is executed for deep data
analytics. To address the privacy concern with offloading
CNNs, researchers have attempted to execute the inference
stage over encrypted data [10]–[12]. These schemes usually
first use approximation strategies to convert non-linear layers
in a CNN to linear operations. Then, homomorphic encryption
is utilized to enable privacy-preserving execution of these
converted operations and other layers in the CNN using
cloud computing. Nevertheless, the adoption of homomorphic
encryption introduces extremely high encryption cost and/or
communication load to the local IoT devices. For example, a
quad-core Raspberry Pi, which outperforms most IoT devices
in terms of computational capability, can perform only four
Paillier homomorphic encryption per second [13]. Given a
single input of AlexNet that has 227 × 227 × 3 elements, it
requires more than 10 hours to complete the encryption, which
is impractical for most applications in terms of both time delay
and energy consumption. (As a comparison, to execute an
inference task with the same AlexNet, a single-core Raspberry
Pi with our solution can finish all local encryption and
decryption within 0.3 second as shown in Section V.) Besides
the high computational cost, the utilization of approximation
in existing research also results in accuracy loss to some
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
04
10
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 J
an
 20
19
extent. Furthermore, these research adopt batch processing to
improve their performance, which is more suitable for the
“Data Collection and Post-Processing” routine. Differently,
on-the-fly processing is desired for IoT devices to fulfill
time-sensitive tasks. Another line of related research utilizes
differential privacy to achieve privacy-preserving offloading of
the training stage of CNNs [14], [15]. These research control
the amount of information leaked from each individual record
in the training dataset. However, differential privacy becomes
unsuitable for the inference stage, because only a single input
is available at this stage.
The other limitation with offloading time-sensitive IoT tasks
to cloud is the reliance on the availability of cloud and its
network condition. To overcome this limitation, one prevalent
solution is to utilize the computing resources at the edge
of network. Compared with cloud computing, edge devices
are geographically closer to IoT devices and usually within
one-hop communication range. Such physical proximity can
effectively ameliorate the network latency and availability
issue. Most current research [16], [17] on edge computing
mainly emphasizes on fundamental issues such as resource
allocation but assumes the edge devices are fully trusted. Such
an assumption, while is probably true for many applications,
can be problematic for other applications where IoT devices
are mobile or edge devices are shared by ad hoc multiple
parties that do not share mutual trust. Examples of such
applications include vehicular networks, drones, and mobile
edge computing (MEC) [18] in general, to name a few. Some
research [19] does address data security and privacy issues in
edge computing. However, efficient and private offloading of
CNN inference to edge devices remains an open challenge.
Another issue is that the IoT devices are not able to
judge the correctness of the returned results from the cloud.
Since the offloaded computation is resource consuming, public
clouds may not be willing to allocate expensive computa-
tional resources and may tend to cheat the IoT devices by
returning random data with the same size of the desired data.
According to [20], in some cases, dishonest cloud service
provides may even discard the data to save resources. How
to effectively detect such dishonest behaviors while maintain-
ing the lightweight computation on IoT devices and overall
performance in time-sensitive CNN inference tasks is another
essential challenge to be solved.
This paper addresses such challenges and proposes an
extremely lightweight edge device assisted private CNN infer-
ence solution for IoT devices, namely LEP-CNN. LEP-CNN
enables IoT devices to securely offload CNN inference tasks
to local edge devices. To significantly speed up the offloading
process, LEP-CNN adopts a novel online/offline encryption.
Specifically, since CNN linear operation over input data and
random noise are separable, encryption and decryption can be
efficiently computed offline. In practical CNN architectures
such as AlexNet and FaceNet, linear operations are dominant
due to their vast number. Therefore, it is rewarding to trade
offline computation and storage (of random noise) for online
computation. As a result, our online/offline encryption allows
IoT devices to securely offload over 99% CNN operations to
edge devices. And edge devices are able to execute CNN infer-
ence on encrypted data as efficiently as on unencrypted data.
In addition, LEP-CNN does not introduce any accuracy loss as
compared to CNN inference over unencrypted data. Compared
with homomorphic encryption based privacy preserving neural
networks [10]–[12], LEP-CNN achieves a better performance
under time-sensitive scenarios due to its lightweight property.
Furthermore, to detect dishonest behaviors from “curious-and-
dishonest” edge devices, our scheme provides an integrity
check mechanism which helps the IoT devices detect incorrect
returned results from edge devices with an over 99% success
rate. Minor computation overhead (1.1% drop of offload
percentage in worst case) is introduced when this integrity
check is on. This integrity check can be optionally turned off
in such scenario that the cloud is considered “curious-and-
honest” to save local computational resources. LEP-CNN can
be customized to support flexible CNN architectures that fulfill
the requirements of different applications.
Extensive experimental evaluation shows the efficiency,
scalability, accuracy and integrity of LEP-CNN. We imple-
mented a prototype over well-known ImageNet [21] dataset
using an uncompressed AlexNet architecture, which involves
2.27 billion operations for each inference result and has com-
parable complexity with these widely adopted architectures,
e.g., FaceNet (1.6 billion operations) and Results (3.6 billion
operations). The experimental results show that LEP-CNN can
securely offload 99.95% computation from the IoT devices for
AlexNet. As a result, we are able to speed up 35.63× for the
execution of CNN-driven IoT AlexNet tasks using a single
laptop as the edge device. Meanwhile, LEP-CNN saves over
95.56% energy consumption compared with fully executing
an AlexNet request on the IoT device. We also deployed
LEP-CNN in a ”curious-and-dishonest” scenario. With the
integrity check feature being turned on, our scheme can still
maintain a high computation offloading rate of 99.33% from
the IoT devices and a 30.00× speedup. In addition, our scheme
keeps the high speedup rate as the complexity of CNN layers
increases. Therefore, it is promising to be scaled up for more
complex CNN architectures.
The rest parts of this paper are organized as follows: In
Section II, we introduce the background of CNN. Section III
presents the detailed construction of our scheme. We state
security analysis and numerical analysis in Section IV. We
further evaluate the practical performance of our scheme with
a prototype evaluation in Section V. We review and discuss
related works in Section VI and conclude this paper in Section
VII.
II. BACKGROUND OF CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL
NETWORK
A CNN contains a stack of layers that transform input data
to outputs with label scores. There are four types of most
common layers in CNN architectures, including: Convolu-
tional Layers, Pooling Layers, Activation Layers, and Fully-
connected Layers.
Convolutional layers extract features from input data. Fig.1
depicts an example of convolutional layer that has an input
data of size n×n×D and H kernels, each of size k×k×D.
The input will be processed into all H kernels independently
to extract H different features. Considering the input and each
kernel as D levels, where each level of the input and kernel
are a n × n matrix and a k × k matrix respectively. Each
level of a kernel starts scanning the corresponding input level
from top-left corner, and then moves from left to right with s
elements, where s is the stride of the convolutional layer. Once
the top-right corner is reached, the kernel moves s elements
downward and scans from left to right again. This convolution
process is repeated until the kernel reaches the bottom-right
corner of this input level. For each scan, an output is computed
using the dot product between the scanned window of input
and the kernel as an example shown in Fig.1. For each kernel,
the output for all D levels will be summed together.
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Fig. 1. Examples of a Convolutional Layer and a Fully-connected Layer
Pooling layers and activation layers are usually non-linear
layers. A pooling layer is periodically inserted between con-
volutional layers. Pooling layers progressively reduce the
spatial size of outputs from convolutional layers, and thus
to make data robust against noise and control overfitting. An
activation layer utilizes element-wise activation functions to
signal distinct identification of their input data. There are a
number of popular pooling strategies (e.g., max-pooling and
average-pooling) and activation functions (e.g., rectified linear
units (ReLUs) and continuous trigger functions), which are ex-
tremely computational efficient compared with convolutional
layers and fully-connected layers. In our scheme, these two
efficient layers will be directly handled on the IoT devices.
Fully-connected layers are usually the final layers of a CNN
to output the final results of the network. In case of a fully-
connected layer, all neurons in it have full connections to
all outputs from the previous layer. As an example shown in
Fig.1, the connection between each neuron and input element
has a weight. To obtain the output of a neuron, elements
connected to it will be multiplied with their weights and then
accumulated.
More details about CNN can be found in ref [22].
III. DETAILED CONSTRUCTION OF LEP-CNN
System Model: LEP-CNN consists of three major entities:
IoT Devices, the Owner of Devices, and Edge Devices. To
deploy IoT devices for CNN-driven tasks, the owner first per-
forms the offline phase to generate encryption and decryption
keys and stores them into the IoT devices. As each set of
encryption and decryption keys will only be used for one
CNN request for security purpose, the owner needs to pre-
load multiple sets of keys into the IoT devices. In Section
III-C, we discuss the storage and remote update of keys to
ensure the performance of different IoT application scenarios.
For trained CNN architectures, the owner stores them using
cloud storage or other accessible platforms, which can be
retrieved by the edge devices when the IoT device enters the
their coverage or pre-requested by the owner. In the online
phase, once the IoT device has a piece of data needs to be
processed by the CNN, it interacts with the edge device to
perform privacy-preserving execution. During this process, the
IoT device efficiently offloads expensive convolutional layers
and fully-connected layers to the edge device, and only keeps
the compute-efficient layers at local. This is motivated by
the fact that convolutional and fully-connected layers occupy
majority of computation and parameters storage in typical
CNNs [23].
Threat Model: In our system, we consider the edge devices
to be “curious-but-honest”, i.e., the edge devices follow our
scheme to correctly conduct the storage, communication, and
computational tasks, but try to learn sensitive information in
IoT devices’ input for the CNN. With our integrity check
feature turned on, our system can also detect “curious-and-
dishonest” edge devices at a high successful rate with minor
efficiency trade-off. We assume the IoT devices are fully
trusted and will not be compromised. The research on pro-
tecting IoT devices is orthogonal to this work. The edge
device has access to the trained CNNs and all ciphertexts
of inputs and outputs for the offloaded convolutional layers
and fully-connected layers in the CNN. This assumption is
consistent with majority of existing works that focus on
privacy-preserving computation offloading [10]–[12]. LEP-
CNN focuses on preventing the edge devices from learning the
IoT devices’ inputs and outputs of each layer in the offloaded
CNN.
There is also a line of research that proposes to infer the
inputs of CNN layers from their outputs [24]. This kind of
inference is not applicable to LEP-CNN, since the edge device
only has access to encrypted outputs from each layer.
We now present the detailed construction of LEP-CNN.
Important notation is summarized in Table I.
A. Offline Phase
In the offline phase, the owner generates encryption and de-
cryption keys for all convolutional layers and fully-connected
layers in a trained CNN. In LEP-CNN, we consider each
element in the input data of convolutional layers and fully-
connected layers is γ-bit long, and λ is the security parameter.
To ensure the security 1
2λ−γ−1 shall be a negligible value in
terms of computational secrecy [25], e.g., < 12128 . Detailed
selection of security parameter is discussed in Section IV-A.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
n× n the size of each level of a convolutional layer’sinput
D
the depth of the input of a convolutional layer
and kernel
k × k the size of a convolutional layer’s kernel matrix
H the number of kernels of a convolutional layer
s the size of stride used for a convolutional layer
p the size of padding used for a convolutional layer
Rc,d n× n random matrices to encrypt the input of a
1 ≤ d ≤ D convolutional layer
αi (
n−k+2p
s
+ 1)× (n−k+2p
s
+ 1) matrices to decrypt
1 ≤ i ≤ H a convolutional layer’s output from H kernels
m the size of a fully-connected layer input vector
T the number of neurons of a fully-connected layer
Rf a m-dimensional random vector to encrypt theinput of a fully-connected layer
β
a T -dimensional decryption vector to decrypt
fully-connected layer outputs
r the sample rate of returned data of a convolutional layer
θ the error rate of returned data of a convolutional layer
As described in Algorithm.1, given a convolutional layer
with a n×n×D input, stride as s, padding as p, and H kernels
(k × k matrices), the owner generates {Rc,d, 1 ≤ d ≤ D} as
the encryption keys and {αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ H} as its decryption
keys, where Rc,d is a n × n random matrix and αi is a
(n−k+2ps +1)×(n−k+2ps +1) matrix. For expression simplicity,
we use Conv(Rc,d, ith) to denote the convolution operation
for the ith kernel with Rc,d as input.
Given a fully-connected layer with a m-dimensional vector
as input and T neurons, the owner first generates a m-
dimensional random vector Rf . Then, the owner takes Rf
as the input of the fully-connected layer to output a T -
dimensional vector β. Rf and β are set as the encryption
key and decryption key respectively for this layer.
For a CNN with x convolutional layers and y fully-
connected layers, x sets of {Rc,d, αi}1≤d≤Dx,1≤i≤Hx and y
sets of {Rf , β} are generated by the owner as a final set of
keys {Enckey, Deckey}. Note that, each set of keys is only
valid for one CNN request in the later online phase. Thus,
the owner will generate multiple sets of keys according to
the necessity of application scenarios as discussed in Section
III-C.
Algorithm 1: Offline Preparation of Convolutional Layer
Input : Input size n× n×D, stride s, padding p, H kernels
Output: Encryption keys Rc,d, 1 ≤ d ≤ D, Decryption keys
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ H
1 Generate random n× n matrices Rc,d, 1 ≤ d ≤ D ;
2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ H do
3 for 1 ≤ d ≤ D do
4 Take Rc,d as input for the ith kernel for convolution
and output Conv(Rc,d, ith);
5 d++;
6 Set αi =
∑D
d=1 Conv(Rc,d, ith);
7 i++;
Algorithm 2: Online Privacy-preserving CNN
Input : Input Data & Trained CNN
Output: CNN Execution Result
1 Set the Layer Input M = Input Data;
2 Set Layers = the collection of all Convolutional Layers and
Fully-connected Layers in CNN;
3 Set Layer = the first Layer from Layers;
4 while Layer is not null do
5 if Layer = Convolutional Layer then
6 Execute the PPCL with M as input.;
7 Set M = output from PPCL;
8 if Layer = Fully-connected Layer then
9 Execute the PPFL with M as input.
10 Set M = output from PPFL;
11 Set Layer = Layers.next();
12 return M as result;
B. Online Phase
During the online phase, the IoT device can efficiently
interact with the edge device to process data using CNN
in a privacy-preserving manner. The overall process of our
online phase is depicted in Algorithm.2. Specifically, the
IoT device offloads encrypted data to the edge device for
performing compute-intensive convolutional layers and fully-
connected layers. Intermediated results are returned back to
the IoT device for decryption. Then, these decrypted results
are processed with the follow up activation layer and pooling
layer (if exist). Outputs are encrypted and offloaded again if
the next layer is a convolutional layer or a fully-connected
layer. This procedure is conducted iteratively until all CNN
layers are executed.
To fulfill these tasks, we designed two privacy-preserving
schemes PPCL and PPFL for convolutional layers and fully-
connected layers respectively.
1) PPCL: Privacy-preserving Convolutional Layer: In
PPCL, we consider a general convolutional layer with a
n × n × D input, stride as s, padding as p, and H kernels
with each size of k × k × D. The dth level of the input is
denoted as a m×m matrix Id.
Input Encryption: The IoT device encrypts the input using
the pre-stored keys {Rc,d} for this convolutional layer as
Enc(Id) = Id +Rc,d (1)
where {Enc(Id)}, 1 ≤ d ≤ D are sent to the edge device.
Privacy-preserving Execution: The edge device takes each
Enc(Id), 1 ≤ d ≤ D as the input of kernels to perform the
convolution process. For the ith kernel, the edge device outputs
D∑
d=1
Conv(Enc(Id), ith) (2)
=
D∑
d=1
Conv(Id, ith) +
D∑
d=1
Conv(Rc,d, ith)
∑D
d=1 Conv(Enc(Id), ith), 1 ≤ i ≤ H are returned back to
the IoT device as intermediate results.
Decryption and Preparation for the Next Layer: Given
the returned
∑D
d=1 Conv(Enc(Id), ith), 1 ≤ i ≤ H , the IoT
device quickly decrypts them as
D∑
d=1
Conv(Enc(Id), ith)− αi =
D∑
d=1
Conv(Id, ith) (3)
where {αi =
∑D
d=1 Conv(Rc,d, ith)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ H are the
pre-stored decryption keys for this layer. Afterwards, the IoT
device performs the activation layer and pooling layer directly
over convolutional output, which are extremely compute-
efficient. For example, one of the most popular activation
layer ReLU only requires translating negative values in the
input to 0. The popular max-pooling (or average-pooling)
layer simply shrinks the data by taking the max value (or
average value respectively) every few values. The output will
be encrypted and sent to the edge device using PPCL for the
next convolutional layer (or PPFL respectively for a fully-
connected layer).
2) PPFL: Privacy-preserving Fully-connected Layer: In
PPFL, we consider a general fully-connected layer with T
neurons and takes a m-dimensional vector V as input.
Input Encryption: Given the input, the IoT device encrypts
it using the pre-stored encryption key Rf for this layer as
Enc(V) = V +Rf (4)
Enc(V) is then sent to the edge device.
Privacy-preserving Execution: On receiving Enc(V), the
edge device takes Enc(V) as the input of the fully-connected
layer. Specifically, the encrypted outcome Enc(O[j]), 1 ≤ j ≤
T of each neuron is computed as
Enc(O[j]) =
m∑
i=1
Enc(V)[i]× wi,j = O[j] + β[j] (5)
where wi,j is the weight between the ith element
of input vector and the jth neuron. Enc(O) =
{Enc(O[1]), Enc(O[2]), · · · , Enc(O[T ])} is sent back
to the IoT device as intermediate results.
Decryption and Preparation for the Next Layer: Given
the returned Enc(O), the IoT device decrypts each Enc(O)
with the pre-stored decryption key β of this layer as
O = Enc(O)− β (6)
Then, the IoT device executes the activation layer with O as
input. The output from the activation layer will be encrypted
and sent to edge device using PPFL if there are any additional
fully-connected layers in the CNN.
To this end, the IoT device is able to efficiently handle
each layer in a CNN. Compute-intensive convolutional and
fully-connected layers are securely offloaded to the edge
using PPCL and PPFL. These compute-efficient layers are
directly handled by the IoT device. Since we develop PPCL
and PPFL as independent modules, they can be customized
and recursively plugged into any CNN no matter how many
different convolutional layers and fully-connected layers it
contains.
C. Discussion - Storage and Update of Pre-computed Keys
LEP-CNN considers two major types of resource-
constrained IoT devices that run CNN-driven applications.
• Type-1: Mobile IoT devices with limited battery life and
computational capability, such as drones.
• Type-2: Static devices with power supply but has limited
computational capability, such as security cameras.
The type-1 devices are usually deployed to perform tasks for
a period time. Therefore, before each deployment, the device
owner can pre-load enough keys to support its CNN tasks.
With regards to the type-2 devices, the owner can perform an
initial key pre-loading and then use remote update to securely
add new offline keys as described in Fig.2.
IoT Device Owner
2. New offline keys encrypted using the IoT device’s secret key (e.g., AES)
Edge DeviceIoT Devices
3. Send encrypted keys 
during devices’ idle time
1. Initial Key 
Deployment
4. Decrypt Keys
Fig. 2. Key Update for Power Connected Devices
LEP-CNN proposes to ensure the timely processing of CNN
requests when they are needed on IoT devices. Instead of
performing real-time CNN requests on every piece of data
collected, resource-constrained IoT devices usually require in-
depth analytics using CNN when specific signals are detected.
Taking real-time search and monitoring using drones as an ex-
ample application for type-1 devices, fast local processing will
be first performed for data collected to get estimated results
[26]. Once suspicious signs are detected in estimated results,
CNN based analytics are further conducted for a small set of
data (e.g., video frames with the detected suspicious object).
Given the high efficiency of LEP-CNN, the performance of
such CNN requests will be timely supported when enough pre-
computed keys are available. For example, when the average
frequency of CNN requests is every one per ten seconds
for a drone, only 360 sets of pre-computed keys are needed
for one-hour deployment, which is longer than most current
drones’ battery life [27]. Security camera is an example of
type-2 devices, which requires CNN-based analytics to extract
detailed information only when alarm is triggered by motion
or audio sensors of the camera. Similar to the drone case,
LEP-CNN can timely support the peak CNN requests when
suspicious signs are detected.
Assuming the average frequency of CNN-required alarm
in a security camera is one per 10 minutes, and each alarm
requires 5 CNN requests, 720 sets of pre-computed keys are
needed for one-day usage. As evaluated in Section IV-B3, an
IoT device with a 32GB SD card is able to store keys to
support 1600 requests for AlexNet. Such a result indicates
4.4 deployments and a 2.22-day support for type-1 and type-2
devices respectively when using AlexNet.
Note that, LEP-CNN is designed for low-cost resource-
constrained devices that require timely processing of moderate
(or low) frequent CNN requests. For application scenarios that
involve a large number of constant CNN requests, e.g., security
critical surveillance systems, computational powerful devices
are suggested to handle CNN requests directly at local.
D. Discussion - Integrity Check on Returned Data
In a scenario where the edge devices are “curious-and-
dishonest”, those edge devices may perform dishonest behav-
iors so that they can save their resource utilities. After receiv-
ing inference requests from the IoT devices, the edge devices
may cheat the IoT devices by skipping the heavy convolutional
operations and sending back random, apparently not correct,
results to the IoT devices. These incorrect results can badly
effect or even completely ruin the final result of the entire
CNN inference. In order to ensure the integrity of returned
data from edge devices, LEP-CNN also provides an optional
integrity check functionality with only a minor efficiency cost.
By enabling the integrity check, the IoT device can achieve
an error detection rate of 99% while only losing 1.1% in
offload percentage in the worst case compared with LEP-CNN
disabling integrity check. The users can decide whether to turn
on this functionality based on the actual deployment scenario
and the trustworthiness of the edge devices.
The basic strategy of integrity check is to first sample a
small portion of elements from returned data in each layer
and then check whether there is an incorrect result occurring
in the selected elements. To validate the correctness of a single
element, the IoT device needs to go through the corresponded
convolution operations locally. Although resource consuming,
with high probability, this validation process can block IoT
devices from taking incorrect results into next layer.
The error detection rate Pr(ED) can be calculated as
below:
Pr(ED) = 1−
(
(1−θ)N
rN
)(
N
rN
) (7)
where N , r and θ is the size, sample rate and error rate
of returned data in a convolutional layer.
(
(1−θ)N
rN
)
is the
combination operation for selecting r × N elements from
(1− θ)×N elements. In order to increase the error detection
rate while lowering the additional validation computation on
IoT device, we provide detailed evaluation by performing
numerical analysis and practical experiments in Section IV
and Section V respectively. Based on our experiment results
on AlexNet, LEP-CNN with integrity check turned on could
achieve over 99% error detection rate while maintaining a
similar computation offload rate compared with LEP-CNN
with integrity check turned off.
IV. ANALYSIS OF LEP-CNN
A. Security Analysis
Theorem IV.1. Given the ciphertext C of a γ-bit random
message M generated using PPCL or PPFL in LEP-CNN,
the probability for a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A to output a correct guess for M shall have
Pr[(M∗ =M)|C]− Pr[M∗ =M] ≤  (8)
where  is a negligible value in terms of computational secrecy
[25], M∗ is A’s guess for M, and Pr[M∗ = M] is the
probability A makes a correct without ciphertext. Specifically,
the corresponding ciphertext generated using PPCL or PPFL
only introduces negligible additional advantages to A for
making a correct guess of M.
Proof. As shown in Eq.1, each level of the input data Id
in PPCL is encrypted by adding an one-time random ma-
trix Rc,d. With regards to each γ-bit element in Id, it is
encrypted by adding a λ-bit random number Rc,d[e], i.e.,
Enc(Id[e]) = Id[e]+Rc,d[e]. Similarly, each element V[e] in
the input of PPFL is encrypted with a random number Rf [e]
as Enc(V[e]) = V[e] +Rf [e]. For expression simplicity, we
use M to denote a γ-bit input element for PPCL or PPFL,
R is the random number to encrypt M as C =M+R. Note
that, R will be re-generated for each encryption using PPCL
or PPFL.
To make a correct guess of M without the ciphertext, the
adversary A has Pr[M∗ =M] = 12γ , whereM∗ is A’s guess
for M.
By given a ciphertext C, there are 2γ possible values for its
plaintexts M if 2γ ≤ C ≤ 2λ − 2γ , because C has the same
distribution as the random number R [28]. Now, if the random
number R used for encryption is the range of [2γ , 2λ − 2γ ],
we have Pr[(M∗ = M)|C] = Pr[M∗ = M] = 12γ . WhenC < 2γ or C > 2λ, we have Pr[(M∗ = M)|C] > 1/2γ .
This is because the total possible inputs are reduced to C or
C − 2λ respectively. Fortunately, the probability Pr[C < 2γ ]
or Pr[C > 2λ] in LEP-CNN is negligible when appropriate
security parameter is selected. To be specific, C < 2γ or C >
2λ can appear when R < 2γ or R > 2λ − 2γ . As Pr[R <
2γ ] = Pr[R > 2λ − 2γ ] = 2γ
2λ
, we have
Pr[R < 2γ or R > 2λ − 2γ ]
= Pr[R < 2γ ] + Pr[R > 2λ − 2γ ] = 1
2λ−γ−1
Thus, to guarantee 1
2λ−γ−1 is a negligible probability, such as
1
2128 , LEP-CNN can set the security parameter λ according to
size of input message, i.e., λ− γ − 1 > 128.
We now use  = 1
2λ−γ−1 to denote the negligible probability,
and get the probability Pr[(M∗ =M)|C] as
Pr[(M∗ =M)|C] ≤ 1
2γ
∗ (1− ) + 1 ∗  = 1
2γ
+ (1− 1
2γ
)
where 12γ ∗ (1 − ) is the probability for a correct guess for
2γ ≤ R ≤ 2λ− 2γ , and the “1” in 1 ∗  is best probability for
a correct guess A can have when [R < 2γ or R > 2λ − 2γ ].
As a result, we get
Pr[(M∗ =M)|C]− Pr[M∗ =M] ≤ (1− 1
2γ
) < 
Since  is negligible value, Theorem IV.1 is proved.
TABLE II
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS SUMMARY
LEP-CNN
Input Size Computation of the IoT (FLOPs) Offloaded Cost Communication Storage OverheadInput Results to the Edge Cost
Encryption Decryption (FLOPs) (Elements) (Elements)
Convolutional n× n×D Dn2 H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 2DHk2(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 Dn2 +H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 Dn2+
H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2
Fully-connected m m T 2mT m+ T m+ T
Offloading using Plaintext without Privacy Protection
Convolutional n× n×D N/A N/A 2DHk2(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 Dn2 +H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 N/A
Fully-connected m N/A N/A 2mT m+ T N/A
In this table: s is the stride, p is the size of padding, H is the number of kernels, k × k is the size of kernels of a convolutional layer; T is the number of
neurons of a fully-connected layer. Each element is 20 Bytes.
TABLE III
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF INTEGRITY CHECK
LEP-CNN
Computation of the IoT (FLOPs) Offloaded Cost Communication Storage OverheadInput Results Results to the Edge Cost
Encryption Decryption Validation (FLOPs) (Elements) (Elements)
Integrity
Dn2
H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 2Dk2× 2DHk2× Dn2+ Dn2 +Hk2+
Check drH(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2e (n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2
No Integrity
Dn2
H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 0 2DHk2× Dn2+ Dn2+
Check (n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2 H(n−k+2p
s
+ 1)2
In this table: s is the stride, p is the size of padding, H is the number of kernels, k × k is the size of kernels of a convolutional layer; θ is the error rate of
the returned data; r is the sample rate of the returned data. Each element is 20 Bytes.
TABLE IV
EXAMPLE NUMERICAL ANALYSIS ON ALEXNET
Parameters Input Size Computation Offloaded Cost Offloaded Communication Storage
of the IoT Percentage Cost Overhead
Conv-1 n=227, H=96k=11, s=4 227× 227× 3 444,987 FLOPs 210,830,400 FLOPs 99.79% 8691.15 KB 8691.15 KB
Conv-2 n=27, H=256k=5, s=1 27× 27× 96 256,608 FLOPs 895,795,200 FLOPs 99.97% 5011.88 KB 5011.88 KB
Conv-3 n=13, H=384k=3, s=1 13× 13× 256 108,160 FLOPs 299,040,768 FLOPs 99.96% 2112.50 KB 2112.50 KB
Conv-4 n=13, H=384k=3, s=1 13× 13× 384 129,792 FLOPs 448,561,152 FLOPs 99.97% 2535.00 KB 2535.00 KB
Conv-5 n=13, H=256k=3, s=1 13× 13× 384 108,160 FLOPs 299,040,768 FLOPs 99.96% 2112.50 KB 2112.50 KB
FC-1 m=9216,T=4096 9216 13,312 FLOPs 75,497,472 FLOPs 99.98% 260.00 KB 260.00 KB
FC-2 m=4096,T=4096 4096 8,192 FLOPs 33,554,432 FLOPs 99.98% 160.00 KB 160.00 KB
FC-3 m=4096,T=1000 4096 5,096 FLOPs 8,192,000 FLOPs 99.94% 99.53 KB 99.53 KB
Total Cost N/A N/A 1,074,307 FLOPs 2,270,512,192 FLOPs 99.95% 20.49 MB 20.49 MB
Computation for All Activation and Pooling Layers on the IoT: 650,080 FLOPs and 1,102,176 FLOPs
TABLE V
EXAMPLE COMPARISON WITH/WITHOUT INTEGRITY CHECK
Computation of the IoT Offloaded Percentage Communication Cost Storage Overhead
No Integrity Integrity No Integrity Integrity No Integrity Integrity No Integrity Integrity
Check Check Check Check Check Check Check Check
Conv-1 444,987 FLOPs 866,793 FLOPs 99.79% 99.59% 8691.15 KB 8691.27 KB 8691.15 KB 8918.03 KB
Conv-2 256,608 FLOPs 2,944,608 FLOPs 99.97% 99.67% 5011.88 KB 5011.98 KB 5011.88 KB 5136.88 KB
Conv-3 108,160 FLOPs 2,504,320 FLOPs 99.96% 99.16% 2112.50 KB 2112.60 KB 2112.50 KB 2180.00 KB
Conv-4 129,792 FLOPs 3,724,032 FLOPs 99.97% 99.17% 2535.00 KB 2535.10 KB 2535.00 KB 2602.50 KB
Conv-5 108,160 FLOPs 3,398,272 FLOPs 99.96% 98.86% 2112.50 KB 2112.59 KB 2112.50 KB 2157.50 KB
B. Numerical Analysis
The numerical analysis of LEP-CNN is summarized in
Table II. For expression simplicity, we use one floating point
operation FLOP to denote an addition or a multiplication. For
a general convolutional layer, n× n×D is the size of input,
s is the stride, p is the size of padding, H is the number of
kernels, and k × k is the size of kernel matrix. For a general
fully-connected layer, m is the dimension of the input vector,
T is the number of neurons. For a pooling layer, q × q is the
size of pooling regions. We use an uncompressed AlexNet
[5] architecture as the study case for analysis, which is a
complex CNN architecture that requires 2.27 billion FLOPs
for each inference request, which has comparable computing
loads as the current prevalent FaceNet (1.6 billion FLOPs) [6]
and ResNet (3.6 billion FLOPs) [7].
1) Computational Cost: In the Online phase of LEP-CNN,
the IoT device offloads compute-intensive convolutional layers
and fully-connected layers to the edge devices. Given a general
convolutional layer, the IoT device only needs to perform
D matrix addition with Dn2 FLOPs for encryption and
H(n−k+2ps + 1)
2 FLOPs for decryption respectively. Com-
pared with executing the same convolutional layer fully on the
IoT device, which takes 2DHk2(n−k+2ps +1)
2 FLOPs, LEP-
CNN significantly reduces real-time computation on the IoT
device. It is worth to note that the stride s in a convolutional
layer is typically a small value (e.g., 1 or 2). For a general
fully-connected layer, the IoT device needs to perform m
FLOPs for encryption and T FLOPs for decryption as shown
in Eq.4 and Eq.6 respectively. Differently, if the IoT device
executes such a fully-connected layer at local, 2mT FLOPs
are needed.
Besides the offloading of convolutional layers and fully-
connected layers, the IoT device also needs to process non-
linear layers at local. Fortunately, these non-linear layers
are extremely compute-efficient. Taking the widely adopted
activation layer - ReLU as an example, it only requires 12Dk2
of its previous convolutional layer’s cost, and 12m of the cost
if the previous layer is a fully-connected layer.
We now discuss the computational cost of LEP-CNN using
AlexNet. As shown in Table IV, LEP-CNN can offload over
99.9% computational cost for convolutional layers and fully-
connected layers, and only leaves lightweight encryption and
decryption on the IoT device. Compared with the offloaded
convolutional layers and fully-connected layers, the local exe-
cution of all non-linear layers only requires 0.08% operations
for AlexNet. This result further affirms our motivation to
offload convolutional layers and fully-connected layers.
With regards to the encrypted execution on the edge de-
vice, LEP-CNN achieves the same computational cost as that
directly using unencrypted data as shown in Table II. This is
because our encryption (Eq.1 and Eq.4) in PPCL and PPFL
schemes make the ciphertexts Enc(Id) and Enc(V) remain
the same dimension as their plaintexts Id and V . Such a decent
property guarantees real-time computational performance on
the edge device.
In the Offline phase, the IoT device owner first prepares
encryption keys by choosing random matrices for convolu-
tional layers and fully-connected layers that will be offloaded.
Meanwhile, the owner will take these encryption keys as inputs
for their corresponding convolutional layers or fully-connected
layers to obtain results as the decryption keys. In Section V, we
show that the offline phase can be efficiently executed using
a regular laptop.
2) Communication Cost: The communication cost of LEP-
CNN comes from the transmission of encrypted inputs and
outputs of convolutional layers and fully-connected layers. In
our implementation, we use 160-bit random numbers (i.e., λ =
160) during all encryption processes in Eq.1 and Eq.4. Thus,
each element in the ciphertext (a matrix or a vector) is 20-
Byte long. To offload a convolutional layer with a n× n×D
input, the IoT device first sends its corresponding ciphertext
contains D encrypted matrices with Dn2 elements in total.
Then, H encrypted result matrices are received from the edge
device with each size of (n−k+2ps +1)× (n−k+2ps +1). With
regards to the offloading of a fully-connected layer that takes
a m-dimensional vector as input, the IoT device needs to send
a m-dimensional vector as encrypted input and receive a T -
dimensional vector as encrypted output from the edge device.
As shown in Table IV, the communication cost for an
offloading of the AlexNet is 20.49MB, which can be efficiently
handled under the edge computing environment [18].
3) Storage Overhead: For the offloading of a convolutional
layer with a n×n×D input, the IoT device needs to store D
random matrices with n2 elements each as the encryption keys,
and H matrices with size of (n−k+2ps +1)× (n−k+2ps +1) as
the decryption keys. To offload a fully connected layer with a
m-dimensional vector as input, a m-dimensional vector and a
T -dimensional vector need to be pre-stored as the encryption
key and decryption key respectively.
Table IV shows the offloading of an AlexNet request needs
20.49MB storage overhead. With the rise of IoT devices, low-
power-consumption SD memory card has become an excellent
fit to economically extend the storage of IoT devices [29],
which usually have more than 32GB capacity.
4) Additional Resource Consumption of Integrity Check:
Turning on the integrity check leads to additional resource con-
sumption to local IoT device. As shown in Table III, given a
returned matrix of size H(n−k+2ps +1)
2 and a sample rate of r,
the validation process in Section III-D brings drH(n−k+2ps +
1)2e additional computation and makes the total computational
cost of IoT devices rise to 2Dk2drH(n−k+2ps + 1)2e. Since
any convolutional result in the entire set of response map can
be incorrect, IoT devices need to store all kernel parameters of
each convolutional layer locally, which adds on Hk2 storage
overhead and makes the total IoT storage overhead to be
Dn2 +H(n−k+2ps + 1)
2 +Hk2.
Table V shows the resource consumption comparison be-
tween LEP-CNN with integrity check turned on and turned
off. The results are calculated when error rate θ = 1% and
sample rate r = 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.8%, 0.8%, 1.1% for Conv-1 -
Conv-5 respectively. Under this setting, IoT device can achieve
TABLE VI
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION RESULTS ON ALEXNET
IoT without LEP-CNN
Offloading IoT Computation Edge Computation Communication Total Speedup(second) (second) (second) (second) (second)
Conv-1 10.01 0.037 0.0103 0.849 0.896 11.17×
Conv-2 40.68 0.0405 0.0435 0.489 0.573 70.99×
Conv-3 19.93 0.0437 0.013 0.206 0.263 75.78×
Conv-4 29.78 0.0498 0.0184 0.248 0.316 94.24×
Conv-5 19.88 0.0420 0.0127 0.206 0.261 76.17×
FC-1 2.22 0.0013 0.0043 0.025 0.031 71.61×
FC-2 1.08 0.001 0.0025 0.016 0.019 56.84×
FC-3 0.27 0.0008 0.0009 0.01 0.012 22.5×
Non-linear 1.137 1.137 N/A N/A 1.137 N/A
Total Cost 124.99 1.353 0.106 2.049 3.508 35.63×
TABLE VII
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION RESULTS ON INTEGRITY CHECK
IoT without LEP-CNN
Offloading Integrity Check Speedup No Integrity Check Speedup(second) (second) (second)
Conv-1 10.01 0.916 10.93× 0.896 11.17×
Conv-2 40.68 0.655 62.11× 0.573 70.99×
Conv-3 19.93 0.402 49.58× 0.263 75.78×
Conv-4 29.78 0.524 56.83× 0.316 94.24×
Conv-5 19.88 0.470 42.30× 0.261 76.17×
FC-1 2.22 0.031 71.61× 0.031 71.61×
FC-2 1.08 0.019 56.84× 0.019 56.84×
FC-3 0.27 0.012 22.5 × 0.012 22.5×
Non-linear 1.137 1.137 N/A 1.137 N/A
Total Cost 124.99 4.166 30.00× 3.508 35.63×
99%+ error detection rate in each convolutional layer. Since
all the multiplication results of rθ are less equal to 1.1×10−4,
the additional communication costs resulted from integrity
check are tiny. As a result, the communication increments
are less than 4.74 × 10−3% of the original communication
costs. Compared with the heavy parameters in fully-connected
layers, the parameters in convolutional layers only stand for a
minor portion of the entire neural network model. Thus, even
the highest additional storage overhead is only 227 KB while
the lowest increment can be as low as 45 KB.
V. PROTOTYPE EVALUATION
We implemented a prototype of LEP-CNN using Python
2.7. In our implementation, TensorFlow and Keras libraries
are adopted to support CNNs. The resource-constrained IoT
device is a Raspberry Pi (Model A) with Raspbian Debian
7, which has 700 MHz single-core processor, and 256MB
memory, and 32GB SD card storage. The edge device and the
IoT device owner is a Macbook Pro laptop with OS X 10.13.3,
3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 16GB memory, and 512GB
SSD. The IoT device and the edge device are connected
using WiFi in the same subnet. We use the well-known
ImageNet [21] as the dataset for the evaluation of AlexNet.
The security parameter λ is set as 160 in our implementation.
We also implemented an AlexNet-structured CryptoNets [10]
as an example to compare our scheme with homomorphic
encryption based privacy preserving neural networks [10]–
[12].
A. Evaluation Results
Efficiency: In this section, we first evaluate the efficiency of
offline phase of LEP-CNN, and then discuss the online phase
for CNN execution efficiency.
To generate the encryption and decryption keys for the
execution of one AlexNet request, LEP-CNN only requires
114ms for the IoT device owner. While each set of keys will
only be used for one request, the owner can efficiently compute
more than 2600 sets of keys for AlexNet using 5 minutes.
In the online phase, the IoT device in LEP-CNN efficiently
executes a CNN request with privacy-preserving offloading to
the edge device. Table VI summarizes the evaluation results of
LEP-CNN on AlexNet. By applying LEP-CNN, the required
computational time on the IoT device is reduced to about 192
for AlexNet. With such a high computational reduction, we
not only overcome the challenges from limited computational
resources of IoT devices, but also save energy consumption
for them to achieve longer battery life. The other part of com-
putational cost of LEP-CNN is from the privacy-preserving
execution of convolutional layers and fully-connected layers
on the edge device. As shown in the fourth column of Table VI,
the edge device served by a laptop can efficiently handle these
operations using encrypted data. In practice, the selection of
layers to offload in CNNs can be customized according to their
complexity, since our PPCL and PPFL schemes are designed
as independent modules for flexible combination. We also
compare the privacy-preserving execution of CNN layers on
the edge device with that using unencrypted data. Table VIII
shows that the encryption execution on the edge device using
TABLE VIII
EXECUTING EACH LAYER OF ALEXNET USING LEP-CNN AND
NON-PRIVACY-PRESERVING APPROACH ON THE EDGE
LEP-CNN No Privacy Protection
(Second) (Second)
Conv-1 0.014 0.012
Conv-2 0.0435 0.041
Conv-3 0.013 0.013
Conv-4 0.0184 0.016
Conv-5 0.012 0.012
FC-1 0.0043 0.004
FC-2 0.0065 0.0063
FC-3 0.0022 0.002
Total Cost 0.123 0.106
our scheme spends almost the same time as executing these
layers without privacy protection. This is also consistent with
our numerical analysis in Section IV-B1, since our ciphertext
has the same dimensions as its corresponding plaintext.
As our scheme requires the interaction between the IoT
device and the edge device during the execution of a CNN re-
quest, another part of cost of LEP-CNN is the communication
cost. In our implementation, we use a wireless network with
10MB/s transmission speed between the IoT device and the
edge device. In real-world scenario, the devices are likely to
be connected via wired or cellular connection, which allows a
higher transmission speed than our experimental environment.
As presented in the fifth column of Table VI, the total
communication time for AlexNet in our network environment
is only about 161 compared with processing the entire AlexNet
on the IoT device without LEP-CNN. Moreover, the upcoming
5G era for MEC environment will significantly empower the
transmission speed [18] and further optimize the communica-
tion performance our scheme.
We now compare the total cost of LEP-CNN with directly
executing CNN on the IoT device. As shown in Table VI,
LEP-CNN can speed up the execution of an AlexNet request
for 35.63×. Among convolutional layers and fully-connected
layers in AlexNet, LEP-CNN can speed up the execution
for over 90×. In Table VII, when the integrity check is
turned on, LEP-CNN can still achieve a high speedup rate of
30.00× compared with AlexNet local execution. These results
also validate the scalability of LEP-CNN. More to mention,
with increasing complexity of convolutional layers and fully-
connected layers, LEP-CNN retains or increases the high
speedup rate as shown in the last column of Table VI and VII.
Taking AlexNet as example, the highest speedup rates for them
are all achieved with these more complex layers. Therefore,
LEP-CNN is promising to be scaled to support more complex
CNN architectures according to practical requirements.
Energy Consumption: Compared with fully executing
AlexNet inference task on the IoT device with high energy
consumption, LEP-CNN significantly saves the energy con-
sumption for computation of the IoT device while introducing
slight extra energy consumption for communication. In our
evaluation, the IoT device (Raspberry Pi Model A) is powered
by a 5V micro-USB adapter. The voltage and current is
measured using a Powerjive USB multimeter [30]. Table IX
shows the average IoT power consumption under different
IoT device status. We observe that the network connection
is a major power cost in IoT device. An idle IoT device
with network connection can have a comparable power cost
as executing AlexNet locally without network connection. In
our measurement, the average active current consumption for
the IoT device is 162mA, which indicates at least 101.24J
energy consumption when fully executing an inference task
on the IoT device with 124.99 seconds as stated in Table
IX. Differently, LEP-CNN reduces the computation on the
IoT device to 1.353 seconds (1.59J energy consumption) with
2.049 seconds extra communication (2.90J energy consump-
tion). Therefore, LEP-CNN can save IoT energy consumption
by 101.19−(1.59+2.90)101.19 = 95.56%.
Accuracy: To validate that there is no accuracy loss in
LEP-CNN, we also implemented original AlexNet without
any encryption. By using the same parameters, LEP-CNN
achieves the exact same accuracy (80.1%) as that obtained
using original AlexNet [5] without any encryption, because
there is no approximation design in LEP-CNN.
Evaluation of Sample Rate r: In order to achieve a high
error detection rate, different sample rate r needs to be
calculated based on different settings in each convolutional
layer. As shown in Figure 3, to make the error detection
rate to surpass 99%, Conv-1 - Conv-5 need to set r to be
0.2%, 0.3%, 0.8%, 0.8%, 1.1% respectively. Figure 4 shows
that as the size of the returned data rises, the sample rate
r required to reach 99%+ error detection rate drops corre-
spondingly. From this observation combined with Figure 5,
the scalability of the integrity check feature is ensured and
the additional resource consumption of a larger, more complex
CNN is always minor compared with its original costs.
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Fig. 3. Evaluation of Sample Rate r and Error Detection Rate
Comparison with CryptoNets: To compare LEP-CNN with
homomorphic encryption based privacy preserving neural
networks [10]–[12] under the same scale, we implemented
AlexNet in CryptoNets version, denoted as A-CryptoNets,
using the same network settings as in [5] and same YASHE
cryptosystem [31] as in [10]. Table X shows the efficiency of
TABLE IX
POWER AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION EVALUATION
IoT without LEP-CNN
Offloading & Idle IoT with IoT IoT
Network Connection Network Connection Computation Communication
Power (W) 0.81 0.78 1.17 1.42
Energy (J) 101.19 N/A 1.59 2.90
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the first convolutional layer in LEP-CNN and A-CryptoNets.
Due to the large input size of AlexNet, the polynomials in A-
CryptoNets needs to be big enough to prevent multiplication
overflow. These big polynomials make the first convolutional
operation cost A-CryptoNets over 10 minutes, which is even
more than the total time cost of walking through each layer
in LEP-CNN. Although processing requests in batches can
help relieve the high computation cost of each inference
request in A-CryptoNets, additional time cost is introduced to
collect and form single requests into a batch. Thus, in time-
sensitive scenarios, LEP-CNN has a better performance than
homomorphic encryption based solutions.
TABLE X
COMPARISON BETWEEN LEP-CNN AND CRYPTONNETS IN FIRST
CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER OF ALEXNET
LEP-CNN AlexNet Scale CryptoNets
(seconds) (seconds)
Encryption 0.012 0.360
Convolution 0.0103 625.856
Decryption 0.025 0.271
VI. RELATED WORK
To enable the offloading of the CNN in a privacy-preserving
manner, Gilad-Bachrach et al. [10] propose a CryptoNets
using “YASHE” homomorphic encryption. CryptoNets allows
cloud computing servers to perform the inference stage of a
CNN using encrypted data only. Meanwhile, the activation
function in the activation layers is replaced with the squared
function to integrate homomorphic encryption. However, high
computational and communication cost are introduced in
CryptoNets due to the utilization of homomorphic encryption,
and thus making them inefficient for time-sensitive application.
In addition, the encryption cost for each request using homo-
morphic encryption is also expensive for resource-constrained
IoT devices. Another limitation of CryptoNets is that its effec-
tiveness can only be guaranteed for small number of activation
layers as indicated in ref [11]. As a result, only small scale
CNN architectures can be supported. To improve CryptoNets,
Chabanne et al. [11] utilize low-degree polynomials to approx-
imate activation layers. In addition, a normalize layer is added
before the non-linear layer with batch normalization, with
which polynomial approximation only needs to be accurate
on a small and fixed interval. Nevertheless, ref [11] follows
the same homomorphic encryption-based design for privacy
protection as that in CryptoNets, and also suffers from the
high computational and communication cost. Recently, ref [12]
introduces CryptoDL that enhances CryptoNets in terms of
efficiency and accuracy. In CryptoDL, low-degree polynomial-
based approximation designs are proposed to support com-
monly used activation functions (i.e. ReLU, Sigmoid, and
Tanh) in activation layers. While CryptoDL reduces about
50% run time compared with CryptoNets, it still requires high
local encryption cost on the IoT device. Furthermore, time-
sensitive tasks require IoT devices to process data on-the-
fly. Unfortunately, these existing research [10]–[12] are more
suitable for the “Data Collection and Post-Processing” routine,
since they require the batch processing of a large number of
requests to improve efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed LEP-CNN that enables re-
source constrained IoT devices to efficiently execute CNN
requests with privacy protection. LEP-CNN uniquely designs
a lightweight online/offline encryption scheme. By discover-
ing the fact that linear operations in CNNs over input and
random noise can be separated, LEP-CNN can pre-compute
decryption keys to remove random noise and thus boosting the
performance of real-time CNN requests. By integrating local
edge devices, LEP-CNN ameliorates the network latency and
service availability issue. LEP-CNN also makes the privacy-
preserving operation on the edge device as efficient as that
on unencrypted data. Moreover, the privacy protection in
LEP-CNN does not introduce any accuracy loss to the CNN
inference. LEP-CNN also provides optional integrity check
functionality to help IoT devices detect erroneous results
from dishonest edge devices. Thorough security analysis is
provided to show that LEP-CNN is secure in the defined threat
model. Extensive numerical analysis as well as prototype
implementation over the well-known CNN architectures and
datasets demonstrate the practical performance of LEP-CNN.
Our experimental results also depict that LEP-CNN prevails in
terms of accuracy and efficiency under time-sensitive scenar-
ios compared with homomorphic encryption based offloading
solutions.
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